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Abstract 
 
Contrasting approaches to assessing the performance of public services highlight important 
issues for policy makers and future research.  We need systematic comparisons between 
countries.  We should use a broader range of evidence.  The public ought to have a greater 
role in designing performance criteria, and we need to know more about the impacts of 
assessments. 
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Introduction 
 
The UK has been at the forefront of the ‘audit explosion’, but its passion for performance 
management has received mixed reviews.  Some commentators believe it has blazed a trail 
that other countries would do well to follow.  Others argue that imposing top down targets 
and external assessments on public services has proved costly and distorted behaviour, 
encouraging managers to concentrate on narrowly focused performance indicators and 
scoring systems to the detriment of the outcomes that matter most to citizens and service 
users.  A third school of thought suggests that there is a need for a contextual and 
evolutionary approach whereby it is necessary to use a tough regime to get public services 
from ‘awful to adequate’, before bringing a more sophisticated combination of policy 
instruments into play to drive further improvement (Barber 2006).  These debates have often, 
however, been rather abstract.  There has been surprisingly little effort to test them 
empirically by analysing and learning from the contrasting approaches to public service 
reform and performance assessment which have been seen within the UK — across different 
sectors, between countries, and over time (Nutley et al. 2012).   
  
Variations and Outcomes 
 
The contrast between sectors has been particularly noticeable in the case of health and local 
government.  In England, the Blair/Brown governments looked to competition and patient 
choice to deliver improvements in the National Health Service (NHS), but relied primarily on 
auditors and inspectors to drive local government reforms; markets and service users played 
only a minor role.  In Wales, ministers sought to exert tight controls over the health service 
from the centre, but until quite recently have allowed local authorities considerable autonomy 
when it comes to performance assessment.  In Scotland, auditors and inspectors have been 
instrumental in shaping performance improvement in local government, whereas their role 
has been far more muted in the NHS, possibly because centralised control has led to a greater 
emphasis on direct line management. 
 
There have been similarly marked variations in approaches to corporate performance 
assessment in local government between different parts of the UK.   Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA) in England was based on the premise that councils needed a 
powerful external prompt in order to identify and address weaknesses.  It therefore provided 
annual assessments based on a standard scoring system which enabled the Audit Commission 
to name and shame ‘poor performers’.  The Scottish Government and Audit Scotland pursued 
a more consensual approach.  Best Value Audits (BVAs) were attuned to local context and 
priorities; councils were only assessed once every three years; and there were no overall 
performance score (Downe et al. 2008).  As a result, it was not easy for ministers and voters 
to make explicit comparisons between local authorities.  Policy makers in Wales argued that 
improvement could not be forced from the centre; it had to come from within councils.  The 
Wales Programme for Improvement (WPI) was tailored to local priorities and each 
authority’s particular improvement journey.  Local authorities undertook self assessments and 
agreed improvement and regulatory plans with the Audit Commission. Unlike England and 
Scotland, assessments were subject to bilateral confidential agreements between councils and 
auditors.  This meant that it was very difficult for ministers or voters to differentiate between 
the good, the bad and the ugly (Downe et al. 2010). 
 
A third important set of differences emerge from longitudinal analysis of approaches to 
performance assessment in England, Scotland and Wales.  Pollitt et al. (2010) draw attention 
to the dynamic nature of performance regimes.  They argue that regimes evolve as a result of 
a combination of external crises which produce ‘punctuations’ (sudden changes) in policy 
pathways and an internal ‘logic of escalation’ which means that once embedded it becomes 
difficult to abandon performance assessment.  In the last ten years, none of the local 
government performance frameworks in the UK have stood still for very long.  CPA was 
introduced in 2002 and revised within three years to provide what the Audit Commission 
called a ‘harder test’.  In 2008 it was abandoned altogether in favour of the broader 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA).  Hailed by the inspectorates as ‘a fundamental 
change in our approach to the assessment of local public services’ designed to reflect the way 
local public services ‘are increasingly working together’ (Audit Commission 2009, p. 4), 
CAA covered local government, health, police and fire services and required inspectorates to 
reach joint judgements about the ways in which services were working together to achieve 
targets set out in community strategies and Local Area Agreements.  The 2010 General 
Election produced an abrupt ‘punctuation’ in policy as the new Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government ordered an immediate end to all work on CAA and the 
abolition of the Audit Commission. CAA has been replaced by a voluntary programme of 
corporate peer challenges conducted by local authority leaders, chief executives and other 
senior officers (Downe and Martin 2012).    
 
In Scotland, the BVA methodology, introduced in 2003, was overhauled in 2009.  Like 
CAA, the second round of BVAs placed much greater emphasis on joint working between 
local government and other local service providers.  Auditors now evaluated both the 
implementation of the duty of best value by local authorities and the achievement by 
Community Planning Partnerships of the targets set out in their Single Outcome Agreements 
with the Scottish Government.  A methodology for auditing Community Planning 
Partnerships piloted in 2012 suggests that BVAs are likely to revert to their original focus on 
local authorities alone and will only be conducted in future by exception when risk 
assessments highlight potential performance problems or capacity issues.  
 
In Wales, new guidance issued in 2005 introduced greater flexibility concerning the nature 
and timing of risk assessments.  The number of statutory performance indicators was also 
slimmed down.  The 2009 Local Government Measure signalled more fundamental changes 
that linked performance assessment explicitly to community strategies and required councils 
to publish performance data.  The secrecy surrounding the assessments made under the WPI 
had made it difficult for minsters to identify and address poor performance.  The new 
framework aimed to provide a more effective early warning system since the Wales Audit 
Office now publishes annual analyses of whether an authority has achieved planned 
improvements and an assessment of its capacity to achieve future improvement.  
Interestingly, just as policy makers in Wales were embracing this more muscular approach to 
performance assessment, the Coalition government in London was busily dismantling the 
frameworks put in place by its predecessors in favour of a ‘sector led’ approach reminiscent 
of the framework previously tried by the Welsh. 
 
 
Learning from Difference 
 
So what can be learned from these contrasting and changing approaches to performance 
assessment which the UK has witnessed over the last decade?  We highlight four issues for 
further analysis and debate. 
 
First, there should be more systematic comparative analysis within the UK.  As Bevan and 
Hood (2006) and Shortridge (2009) urge, England, Scotland and Wales now provide a natural 
experiment that potentially enables us to evaluate different and divergent approaches to 
addressing shared service delivery problems and concerns in countries with similar socio-
economic, cultural and legal settings.  In practice though, the politics of devolution have 
impeded policy learning.  Whitehall often seems indifferent to developments in the Celtic 
nations.  Meanwhile the devolved administrations are eager to differentiate their policies 
from those developed in Westminster.  Welsh ministers in particular have been fond of 
pointing out the ‘clear red water’ which has opened up between Cardiff and London.  Of 
course this makes political sense.  One of the principal drivers of devolution was the 
contention that Scotland and Wales needed home-grown solutions attuned to their own 
particular contexts and priorities.  But policy makers then often miss valuable opportunities to 
learn about what works, where and how.  There are also practical problems in conducting 
rigorous comparative analysis.  A decade ago, England and Wales, and to some extent 
Scotland, shared similar sets of statutory performance indicators which made it possible to 
compare the performance of local public services across the three countries.  But in recent 
years they have all developed their own unique national sets of measures — which has made 
it impossible to track performance over time or to compare between jurisdictions (Andrews 
and Martin, 2010).   
 
Second, partly because of the problems of conducting longitudinal and comparative analysis 
based on statutory performance indicators, researchers and policy makers should consider 
what other evidence might be used to assess the performance of local government (and other 
public services).  England, Scotland and Wales have all invested heavily in the development 
of inter-authority benchmarking in recent years.  The Improvement Service in Scotland has 
developed a benchmarking scheme and toolkit covering services provided by Scottish local 
authorities.  The Local Government Data Unit provides a similar service in Wales, and the 
LG Inform project developed by the LGA provides an on-line tool enabling local authorities 
in England to compile their own comparative analyses.  All are significant resource- and 
data-hungry undertakings.  They pay a great deal of attention to data quality and ensuring that 
the information supplied by authorities is valid, comparable and consistent.  However, they 
all rely on a narrow band of metrics derived from administrative data and statutory 
performance indicators.  As a result, whilst they provide evidence about internal processes 
and individual services, they have little to say about broader outcomes.  Rather than searching 
for perfectly calibrated benchmarks, managers need to be more willing to work with data that 
are ‘good enough’.  Often too much effort has been put into the ‘front end’ task of producing 
data and too little effort given to making sure it is used effectively. In our view, there is a 
strong case for broadening the range of evidence that is used for comparative analysis, 
including capturing ‘softer’ intelligence such as feedback from staff.  This implies the need 
for a ‘whole systems’ approach that links up all of the different elements of a performance 
framework including self-assessments, peer challenge, statutory reporting and external 
inspections.  To some extent this is what CAAs, BVAs and the WPI attempted to do. As these 
frameworks disappear or fade into the background it will be important to find new methods 
that facilitate rounded assessments. 
 
Third, there are important questions about the role citizens play in assessing performance.   
Notionally, most assessments are undertaken in some sense on behalf of the public (or ‘in the 
public interest’), and there has been a lot of talk of putting the ‘citizen at the centre’ (in 
Wales) and of the importance of ‘armchair auditors’ (in England).   In practice, however, 
members of the public are usually peripheral participants in the assessment process. They are 
sometimes surveyed for their views but rarely involved in discussions about what outcomes 
matter most to them or what kinds of evidence they would like.  There have been a number of 
attempts to make performance data available in more ‘user-friendly’ formats including, for 
example, star ratings and the ‘Oneplace’ website set up by the Audit Commission, both of 
which aimed explicitly at increasing public interest in, and understanding of, performance 
assessments.  Citizens have shown much less interest in these data than policy makers hoped.  
Social media may offer a way for councils to engage more effectively with some sections of 
the community, but public services need to become better at tailoring performance data for 
different audiences.  There seems to have been an assumption that the same information that 
is used to help managers improve services will also enable the public to hold those managers 
to account.  There has also been a lack of attention to tailoring both the messages and the 
media to the needs and preferences of different groups.  Policy makers and politicians need to 
be realistic about the level of engagement citizens want to have. But it seems to us that with 
the right engagement strategies it would possible for the public to become more involved in 
designing measures that they consider important and meaningful.  
 
Finally, we still lack a proper understanding of the impact of performance assessment on 
public services.  As a result, potentially far reaching policy decisions, such as the scrapping 
of CAA and Audit Commission in England, appear to be based on political instinct, rather 
than rigorous analysis of the likely effects and possible unintended consequences (Walker, 
2011).  To fill this gap in knowledge there is a need for more ‘real time’ research about how 
different approaches to performance assessment operate in practice.  It will also be important 
to find out more about assessments interact with other elements of the wider performance 
regime which they form part of.  Do adverse assessments make matters worse by 
demoralising and demotivating the workforce, and making it more difficult to recruit and 
retain good staff?  What happens when different kinds of evidence provide conflicting 
accounts about a council’s performance?  Other questions that would repay further research 
include how the role of assessment changes in an era of austerity and what can be learnt from 
international experiences?  It is also important to find out more about the limits to 
performance assessment - what can it achieve what is beyond its reach - and how policy 
makers should respond if self assessment, external inspection, peer support and government 
intervention all fail to produce performance improvement? 
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This paper draws on research undertaken as part of the Economic and Social Research 
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